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Fiscal Consequences of Electoral Institutions
Christopher R. Berry University of Chicago
Jacob E. Gersen University of Chicago
Abstract
There are more than 500,000 elected local government ofﬁcials in the United
States. The most electorally dense county has more than 20 times the average
number of elected ofﬁcials per capita. This paper offers the ﬁrst systematic
investigation of the link between electoral density and ﬁscal outcomes. Electoral
density presents a tradeoff between accountability and monitoring costs. In-
creasing the number of specialized elected ofﬁces promotes issue unbundling,
reducing slack between citizen preferences and government policy; but the costs
of monitoring a larger number of ofﬁcials may offset these beneﬁts, producing
greater latitude for politicians to pursue their own goals at the expense of citizen
interests. We predict diminishing returns to electoral density and a U-shaped
relationship between the number of elected local ofﬁcials and government ﬁ-
delity to citizen preferences. We ﬁnd that public sector size decreases with
electoral density up to a point, beyond which budgets grow as more ofﬁcials
are added.
1. Introduction
Perhaps the most fundamental question for a constitutional democracy is how
to structure the relationship between the public and politicians. However, em-
pirical evidence about some extremely basic facets of the electoral system is
lacking. First and foremost among these is how the number and type of elected
ofﬁcials in a jurisdiction affect public policy. Elections may be the cornerstone
of democracy, but without a rigorous understanding of how the number of
elected ofﬁces and the scope of electoral jurisdictions affect policy, critical ques-
tions in democratic theory will go unanswered.
Indeed, the ability of citizens in the United States to select their governing
ofﬁcials varies enormously from place to place. For instance, Lake County, Il-
linois, is governed by 1,125 local ofﬁceholders, whereas the similarly populated
We are grateful for very useful comments from Avinash Dixit, Nicole Garnett, Eric Helland, Rick
Hills, Anup Malani, Roger Myerson, and Eric Posner. Thanks to Peter Wilson for excellent research
assistance. Financial support was provided by the John M. Olin Foundation, the Lynde and Harry
Bradley Foundation, the Stigler Center, the Smith Richardson Foundation, and the Robert B. Roesing
Faculty Fund.
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Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, has only 67 elected ofﬁcials. This paper
explores how variation in the structure of local electoral institutions exacerbates
or mitigates agency problems between voters and elected ofﬁcials in local ﬁscal
behavior. Speciﬁcally, we model the taxing and spending of local governments
as a function of the number and nature of elected ofﬁcials within a jurisdiction.
Our central claim is that the addition of elected ofﬁcials often unbundles policy
issues so as to produce greater voter control over elected ofﬁcials. However,
because monitoring elected ofﬁcials entailscosts,havingtoomanyelectedofﬁcials
in a jurisdiction can sometimes worsen agency problems and produce greater
slack in the relationship between voters and politicians. This dynamic can pro-
duce a U-shaped relationship between the number of elected ofﬁcials in an area
and ﬁdelity to voter preferences.
The theory and data capture essential elements of the relationship between
electoral institutions and public policy not previously emphasized or analyzed.
For example, the existing literature contains conﬂicting views of the relationship
between the size or structure of government and the level of taxing and spending.
Different theoretical and empirical camps insist that the relationship is positive,
negative, or nonexistent. This disagreement results, in part, from a lack of pre-
cision and nuance about the different types of elected ofﬁcials. Electoral insti-
tutions come in many shapes and sizes. There are more than 500,000 elected
ofﬁcials in the United States, or roughly one representative for every 600 in-
habitants. The vast majority of these elected ofﬁcials—96 percent—are in local
governments. In addition to electing members of local governing bodies, such
as city councils, county commissions, and school boards, voters choose myriad
ofﬁcials in the local executive and judicial branches, including mayors, judges,
sheriffs, and treasurers, to name only a few. The relationship between electoral
structures and local policy making has broad implications for the practice of
democracy at all levels of government.
2. Background and Theory
In textbook theories of democracy, elections ensure that politicians’ behavior
and public policy are consistent with public preferences (Dahl 1989; Sen 1983).
This idealized view of elections, however, has long since faltered for many reasons
discussed extensively in the literature (see, for example, Persson and Tabellini
2000).
1 Perhaps most important, the relationship between citizen and legislator
is riddled with agency problems. Elections provide a mechanism for voters to
select representatives who are more likely to take desirable actions (Gordon,
Huber, and Landa 2007; Fearon 1999; Zaller 1992), to sanction legislators who
fail to enact policy consistent with voter preferences (Austen-Smith and Banks
1989; Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986), or both (Ashworth 2005; Ashworth and Bueno
1 The whole notion of popular will might be either incoherent or nonexistent (Campbell et al.
1960; Riker 1982; Zaller 1992).
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de Mesquita 2007; Banks and Sundaram 1998, 1993). Participating in elections,
however, is costly to voters: voters must collect the requisite information to
select, reward, or sanction elected ofﬁcials appropriately and then turn out at
the polls on election day. As such, variation in the electoral structures within
and across jurisdictions will affect both the extent of slack in politics and the
costs of political participation.
This paper emphasizes one signiﬁcant, but poorly understood, source of var-
iation: the number of elected ofﬁcials. Increasing the number of elected ofﬁcials
improves the ability of voters to sanction politicians by unbundling issues into
specialized domains (Besley and Coate 2001, 2003). Elections are a crude mech-
anism for selecting or sanctioning ofﬁcials when the ofﬁcial is responsible for
multiple policy issues but the citizen has only one vote. Unbundling an issue
by creating a specialized elected ofﬁce to govern it enables voters to better ensure
implementation of their preferred policy outcome on that issue (Besley and Coate
2003).
2 We build on the issue-unbundling framework by linking it to the number
of elected ofﬁcials and integrating a theoretical and empirical focus on attendant
unbundling costs. In this applied context, increasing the number of elected
ofﬁcials makes monitoring politicians more costly for voters. Depending on how
these countervailing forces of accountability beneﬁts and monitoring costs offset
one another, increasing the number of elected ofﬁcials may either increase or
decrease the extent of aggregate slack in the relationship between voters and
politicians; unbundling reduces slack, but the attendant monitoring costs for
voters may undermine this effect.
3
Electoral monitoring costs are a function of the number of policy domains
and the number of elected ofﬁcials. First, a citizen must determine whether
policy in each dimension has been set to a desirable level or, more generally,
whether a “good” policy or a “bad” policy has been enacted. Second, for each
elected ofﬁce, the citizen must be able to identify the incumbent and assess his
or her ability or responsibility for a particular service or services. On most ballots,
citizens see a list of ofﬁces and a list of names for each ofﬁce. The ballot may
not identify the incumbent, and in most cases it does not even list a political
party afﬁliation.
4 At a minimum, a voter must be able to identify the incumbent
for each ofﬁce and match the incumbent to an assessment of the services per-
formed by the ofﬁce in question. Where there is only one general purpose ofﬁce,
all services can be attributed to one ofﬁcial. The voter needs only to know which
2 Besley and Coate (2003) provide empirical support for their issue-unbundling argument by
contrasting elected and appointed utility regulators. Using panel data for U.S. states, they ﬁnd that
elected regulators systematically enact more consumer-friendly policies than do appointed regulators.
They do not, however, consider monitoring costs associated with issue unbundling, nor do they
explore the implications of unbundling more than one ofﬁce.
3 This question is related to important work on the optimal number of governments and related
implications for negotiation among electoral institutions (Cooter 2000, pp. 101–25). It also relates
to Maskin and Tirole (2004), which focuses on when authority should be given to elected ofﬁcials
and nonaccountable ofﬁcials, such as judges.
4 About three-quarters of local elections are nonpartisan (Renner 1999).
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candidate is the incumbent and to form an overall assessment of the incumbent’s
performance, but where there are many ofﬁces, the task becomes considerably
more challenging. It is not unusual to ﬁnd several dozen elected ofﬁces on a
ballot. In these cases, the extent of unbundling and the potential costs of par-
ticipation are quite signiﬁcant. In the discussion that follows, the term “moni-
toring costs” refers to the total effort required to evaluate all services in a ju-
risdiction and match them to the relevant incumbent ofﬁcials.
Because issue unbundling via specialized elected ofﬁces increases the costs of
voting, selective participation may also result. That is, voters with the strongest
preferences about the given policy dimension are the ones most likely to bear
these increasing costs of participating in speciﬁc elections (Berry 2009; Moe
2006; Dunne, Reed, and Wilbanks 1997). Voters with little at stake may rationally
focus their limited political attention elsewhere, not voting in some elections on
the ballot. Put differently, political participation may be increasingly selective as
the extent of unbundling increases, and interest groups will tend to dominate
unbundled elections. Because most interest groups want more, rather than less,
government spending on the policies they care about,
5 the addition of elected
ofﬁcials may lead to more majority-friendly policies up to a point because the
marginal beneﬁts of unbundling are greater than the marginal costs of moni-
toring. However, at some point, marginal monitoring costs may exceed marginal
unbundling beneﬁts, bringing policy closer to minoritarian preferences. If mar-
ginal unbundling beneﬁts decrease with the number of ofﬁcials and marginal
monitoring costs increase, then the overall relationship between the number of
ofﬁcials and policy outcomes should exhibit diminishing returns. At some point,
marginal monitoring costs may even outweigh marginal unbundling beneﬁts,
potentially resulting in a U-shaped relationship between the number of elected
ofﬁcials and government spending. Whether this or any other nonlinear shape
results is, of course, an empirical question. If electoral institutions were optimally
unbundled, the positively sloped side of the U shape would never be realized in
practice.
6
The remainder of the paper explores these ideas in the context of local ﬁscal
policy. Using a mixture of parametric and semiparametric methods, we estimate
the relationship between the number of elected ofﬁces in a political jurisdiction
and the ﬁscal behavior of local governments. We ﬁnd evidence that some un-
bundling produces less spending but that the marginal effect is decreasing: ju-
risdictions can have too much unbundling, which increases spending, and, by
assumption, slack, rather than decreasing it. Even if one resists the theoretical
5 Although there are certain taxpayer groups that promote smaller government overall, we are
aware of relatively few groups that ﬁght for lower provision of services in particular policy areas,
such as education or policing.
6 Note too that we have said nothing about the welfare consequences of issue unbundling. The
welfare consequences of issue unbundling parallel those of logrolling in legislatures. A logroll may
be welfare enhancing even if a majority of legislators opposes each element of the logroll dimension
by dimension.
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account of the dynamic between voters and legislators speciﬁed above, the em-
pirical analysis ﬁlls a major void in the existing political economy literature on
democratic governance.
3. Related Literature
Although the relationship between the number of elected ofﬁces and ﬁscal
policy has not been studied, other literatures have explored how the size of
governing institutions affects spending. For example, a robust literature predicts
that legislative bodies with more members will tend to overspend. Weingast,
Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) show that, in a legislature with a norm of univer-
salism, districted elections, and general taxation authority, the scale of budget
projects increases as the number of districts and, therefore, legislators grows.
This effect has come to be known as the “law of 1/n,” which summarizes the
share of tax costs internalized by any single district as the legislature grows. These
models essentially treat the tax base as a common-pool resource, which produces
standard problems of overextraction.
7 The model was developed in the context
of the U.S. Congress, but its empirical support has come primarily from studies
of other legislative bodies.
8 For example, Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995) show
that state-level expenditures are positively related to the number of seats in a
state legislature, which they interpret as supporting the hypothesis that increasing
the number of elected ofﬁcials leads to more spending than citizens would like.
At the local level, Baqir (2002) ﬁnds that jurisdictions with more city council
districts (more elected ofﬁcials on the city council) spend more. Langbein, Crew-
son, and Brasher (1996) also ﬁnd that per capita expenditures are positively
related to the number of elected members of the city council (in a sample of
cities with a council-manager form of government and a weak mayor). Similarly,
Dalenberg and Duffy-Deno (1991) argue that cities with ward elections tend to
spend more than cities with at-large election systems, which they link to the
problem of concentrated beneﬁts and diffuse costs that underlies the law of 1/n.
Other political institutions, such as direct citizen initiatives or referenda, can
also reduce the severity of agency problems by unbundling issue dimensions.
For example, Matsusaka (1995, 2004) shows that states with a direct citizen
initiative (allowing voters to reduce the power of agenda control exercised by
legislators in noninitiative states) have lower levels of spending than do states
without this institution. Gerber (1999) also ﬁnds that states with the initiative
7 Cabined by its own terms, the literature on the law of 1/n does not apply to all elected ofﬁcials
but merely to a subset of elected ofﬁcials. Adding districts to a legislature should exacerbate the
common-pool problem underlying the law of 1/n, but adding other nonlegislative elected ofﬁces
should not. On the other hand, adding specialized elected ofﬁces unbundles policy authority, whereas
adding seats in the legislature does not. We suggest that two distinct forces are at work for these
two different types of elected ofﬁces. It is therefore critical in empirical analysis to distinguish
legislative-body elected ofﬁcials from non-legislative-body elected ofﬁcials.
8 Knight (2006) provides a useful review and synthesis of the literature on common-pool problems
in legislatures.
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produce social policies that more closely reﬂect voter preferences. On the other
hand, Farnham (1990) ﬁnds only modest effects of recalls, initiatives, and ref-
erenda on local public expenditures, and Besley and Case (2003) ﬁnd that in-
ferences about the initiative’s effect on ﬁscal outcomes are highly sensitive to
how the model’s standard errors are estimated.
However, other theoretical approaches predict no effects of political institu-
tions on ﬁscal outcomes. Compare the Tiebout (1956) model and its progeny
(see generally Sprunger and Wilson 1998; Taylor 1995; Sonstelie and Portney
1978; Rose-Ackerman 1983; Rauscher 1998; Perroni and Scharf 2001). If citizens
are mobile, jurisdictions that overextract from their tax base will suffer an exodus
of residents and capital. If local governments compete with each other for an
increased tax base, then the right bundle of public goods, taxes, and spending
should be provided to each group.
9 The literature on local government com-
petition is expansive, and we wish to make only a gesture in its direction.
10
However, if it is correct, then institutional variation, such as the number of
elected ofﬁcials or the structure of different governmental units, should be largely
irrelevant for determining ﬁscal outcomes. Voting with one’s feet makes voting
at the ballot box superﬂuous, implying that neither the number of ofﬁcials nor
the structure of local government should be systematically associated with gov-
ernment taxation, spending, or borrowing in a perfectly competitive local gov-
ernment “market.”
11
4. Institutional Background
Because virtually nothing has been written on the local elected ofﬁces that are
the subject of this paper, we begin by offering an overview of the institutional
environment we seek to explore.
12 Table 1 contains some basic descriptive sta-
tistics about the number and distribution of elected ofﬁcials. In 1992, there were
over 500,000 elected ofﬁcials in the United States in federal, state, and local
government. The federal elected ofﬁcials are largely familiar: senators, represen-
tatives, the president, and the vice president.
State government elected ofﬁcials are a substantially larger class, consisting of
more than 18,000 elected ofﬁcials. Across states, there is signiﬁcant variation
with respect to how many ofﬁcials are elected. For example, Delaware has only
80 elected state ofﬁcials, whereas Pennsylvania has 1,200. Forty percent of all
state elected ofﬁcials are members of state legislatures. The remainder consists
of other elected ofﬁcials (53 percent), including executive, administrative, and
judicial functions; elected members of state boards (7 percent), including a
9 But see, for example, Epple and Zelenitz (1981) for an argument that Tiebout competition alone
is insufﬁcient to constrain government excesses.
10 Wilson (1999) provides an excellent review of the literature on tax competition.
11 Unless altering the number of elected ofﬁcials is systematically the method by which local
jurisdictions produce policy in order to compete for citizens.
12 The discussion is drawn from the 1992 Census of Governments (COG; U.S. Census Bureau
1995), the last to collect detailed data on locally elected ofﬁcials.
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Table 1
Elected Ofﬁcials and Governments in the United States, 1992
Total
Members of
Governing
Boards
Other Elected
Boards
Other Elected
Ofﬁcials
Number of
Governments
Federal government 542 540 . . . 2 1
State governments 18,828 7,461 1,331 10,036 50
All local governments 493,830 342,812 40,922 110,096 85,955
General purpose:
County 58,818 17,274 10,835 30,709 3,043
Subcounty:
Municipal 135,531 107,542 4,157 23,832 19,279
Town or township 126,958 51,770 25,930 49,258 16,656
Special purpose:
School districts 88,434 83,596 . . . 4,838 14,422
Special districts 84,089 82,630 . . . 1,459 31,555
Total 513,200 350,813 42,253 120,134 86,006
Source. U.S. Census Bureau (1995).
handful of school board members in state-operated school systems (Alaska,
Hawaii, Maine, and New Jersey); and soil conservation district boards in Arizona,
Delaware, Louisiana, Missouri, and Washington.
The vast majority of elected ofﬁcials serve in local governments. A staggering
343,000 elected ofﬁcials are found on the governing boards of counties, mu-
nicipalities, townships, special districts, and school districts. These governing
bodies, such as city councils and school boards, represent the legislative branch
of local government. For the purposes of our analysis, we are especially interested
in the other 120,000 elected ofﬁcials who serve in specialized ofﬁces of the local
executive and judicial branches. To get a sense of the non-governing-body elected
ofﬁcials category, consider Table 2, which lists the numbers of various non-
governing-body elected positions by the different types of local government. For
example, there are 324 county executives in the United States and 11,499 mayors
of cities and towns.
13 Certain ofﬁcials are associated exclusively or almost ex-
clusively with certain levels of government. County executives are of this sort,
as are coroners and sheriffs, who are always county ofﬁcials. There are 2,930
elected county sheriffs in the United States and 1,466 elected coroners. Road or
highway commissioners are never county elected ofﬁces, but surveyors always
are.
14
13 For a useful summary of the structures of municipal governments, see DeSantis and Renner
(2002).
14 Note that Table 2 is a summary only of elected ofﬁces. It says nothing about the number or
distribution of appointed ofﬁces with the same functions. For certain ofﬁces that all governments
at a given level must have, it is possible to infer the number of appointed ofﬁcials. For example, if
all counties had coroners, we could calculate the number of appointed coronersbysimplesubtraction.
As a general matter, this is not possible because not all counties, municipalities, or towns have
identical slates of ofﬁces. However, even if precise ﬁgures cannot be obtained, the ﬁnal column in
Table 2 is a rough indicator of the prevalence of electing a given ofﬁce. For example, only 317
counties elect county executives, whereas 1,177 elect a probate judge.
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Table 2
Elected Ofﬁcials Not Serving on Governing Boards
Ofﬁce County Municipal Township Total
Counties Where
Present
County executive 324 . . . . . . 324 317
Mayor . . . 11,380 119 11,499 2,699
Assessor 1,703 636 4,907 7,246 1,997
Attorney 1,842 425 67 2,334 2,018
Auditor 815 1,367 4,998 7,180 853
County clerk 1,648 . . . 7 1,655 1,649
Clerk . . . 3,735 12,046 15,781 1,334
Clerk of the court 1,812 138 35 1,985 1,807
Constable 3,100 176 2,830 6,106 904
Justice of the peace 2,862 482 3,161 6,505 826
County or probate judge 1,901 . . . . . . 1,901 1,177
Municipal judge . . . 1,360 201 1,561 569
Coroner 1,466 . . . . . . 1,466 1,386
Sheriff 2,930 . . . . . . 2,930 2,930
Police chief . . . 649 52 701 358
Recorder 1,040 351 29 1,420 1,181
Collector 295 4 55 354 326
Treasurer 2,126 2,221 8,054 12,401 2,289
Road or highway commissioner . . . 120 2,423 2,543 271
Superintendent of schools 460 . . . 1 461 459
Surveyor 562 . . . . . . 562 562
Other 5,716 470 10,184 16,370 1,691
Source. U.S. Census Bureau (1995).
The tremendous variation in the number of elected ofﬁces from place to place
is indicated in Table 3. We begin by creating county-area summaries of the total
number of elected ofﬁces (excluding governing boards) in all governments. Cook
County, Illinois, with a sum total of 370 elected ofﬁces in all of its local gov-
ernments, leads the nation. We then compute our two primary measures of
electoral density: the number of elected ofﬁces per capita and per general purpose
government. The average county area has 1.7 elected ofﬁces per 1,000 capita and
4.4 elected ofﬁces per government. At the low end, there are six counties where
no local government has a non-governing-body ofﬁce, and these counties register
a zero for both measures of electoral density. At the high end, Slope, North
Dakota, has 75 elected ofﬁces per 1,000 capita, which means that nearly 10
percent of the population serves in a local ofﬁce.
We are certainly not the ﬁrst either to observe that variation exists in the
structure and size of government or to analyze local government data. Prior
studies have emphasized government reform efforts—for example, use of ap-
pointed chief executives—as determinants of spending (see Jung [2006] for an
overview).
15 However, although Baqir (2002) and Langbein, Crewson, and
15 A common approach is to ask whether cities that reformed their government structures spend
more or less than cities that have not. Some studies conclude that municipal governments of the
council-manager form spend less than mayor-council municipalities (Booms 1966; Lineberry and
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Table 3
Aggregate County-Area Elected Ofﬁces
Average Min
25th
Percentile Median
75th
Percentile Max
County
Min
a Max
Total 26.3 0 9 13 33 370 Maui Cook, Ill.
Per 1,000 capita 1.7 0 .3 .7 1.6 74.7 Maui Slope, N. Dak.
Per government 4.4 0 2 3 5.4 90 Maui Rutland, Vt.
Source. U.S. Census Bureau (1995).
aNot a unique minimum. Six counties have no non-governing-body elected ofﬁcials.
Brasher (1996) ﬁnd a positive relationship between the number of seats on a
city council and the level of expenditures, no one, so far as we are aware, has
examined the broader question of the relationship between the number of local
elected ofﬁces and local government ﬁscal behavior.
Explaining the genesis and evolution of electoral structure is an important
and independent line of inquiry we are pursuing. However, this paper’s more
modest goal is to analyze the effects of certain types of government structure
on policy outcomes. Other ongoing research seeks to analyze why different
political jurisdictions structure authority in different ways along this dimension,
a subject that has not been previously studied.
5. Data and Methods
Because the functional responsibilities of different types of local governments
vary across states, we use county aggregates as the unit of analysis.
16 In some
counties, a given service will be provided by a special purpose government; in
other counties, the same service will be provided by a general purpose govern-
ment. However, at the level of county aggregates, in general, a similar bundle
of services is provided.
We begin by summing the number of elected ofﬁces in all governments within
a county.
17 The number of elected ofﬁces is then normalized by the number of
governments and by county population to produce two explanatory variables of
interest: elected ofﬁces per capita and elected ofﬁces per government. The nu-
merator, elected ofﬁces, is computed by summing the number of total elected
ofﬁces in the county, excluding ofﬁcials on governing bodies such as city or
county councils. In other words, this variable captures all of the ofﬁces listed in
Fowler 1967; Clark 1968; Stumm and Corrigan 1998). Other studies conclude that reformed mu-
nicipalities spend more (Sherbenou 1961; Nunn 1996; Cole 1971; French 2004). Others ﬁnd a null
effect (Lyons and Morgan 1977; Dye and Garcia 1978; Morgan and Pelissero 1980; Deno and Mehay
1987; Hayes and Chang 1990; Morgan and Watson 1995).
16 In states that do not ofﬁcially have county governments, we use the county area, as designated
by the Census of Governments.
17 The number of elected ofﬁces is sometimes different than the number of elected ofﬁcials. The
main difference is that some elected ofﬁces are occupied by multiple ofﬁcials. The ofﬁces of judge
and constable are common examples.
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Table 2. Each ofﬁce is counted only once, regardless of the number ofﬁceholders.
We then divide the number of elected ofﬁces by the total number of general
purpose governments within the county to calculate the per-government mea-
sure. The variable for elected ofﬁces per government is a rough measure of the
degree of unbundling within a county.
18 The more functional elected ofﬁces
within a county, the greater the degree of unbundling. Similarly, the greater the
number of ofﬁces, the greater the total costs of monitoring. Both measures
indicate what we call the electoral density of a county, and both capture the
unbundling and monitoring costs intuition.
By disaggregating the data on elected ofﬁcials into legislative-body and non-
legislative-body ofﬁcials, we are able to distinguish two potentially conﬂicting
effects that could easily confound empirical estimates. The average council size
for general purpose governments in a county controls for the effect of legislative-
body elected ofﬁcials. If the literature on the law of 1/n is correct, the average
city council size should be positively associated with spending.
The main dependent variable is general own-source revenue per capita. The
numerator is the sum of own-source revenue across all governments in a county,
excluding intergovernmental transfers, and the denominator is county popula-
tion. Own-source revenue accounts for 58 percent of all local government general
revenue.
19 The substantive conclusions hold with alternative dependent variables,
including direct general expenditures per capita and expenditures on speciﬁc
budget line items.
Electoral institutions are obviously not the only or even the primary deter-
minants of local ﬁscal patterns. We use a set of control variables with a strong
foundation in the prior literature. The ﬁrst control is income per capita. Ac-
cording to Wagner’s Law, the demand for government services should increase
with income (Musgrave and Peacock 1958). Second, population characteristics
may reﬂect tastes for public goods (Cutler, Elmendorf, and Zeckhauser 1993).
The proportion of families with children controls for demand for education, as
does the fraction of the population older than 65 because older populations
often prefer lower spending on education (Poterba 1997). Additional costs may
also be associated with serving an elderly population. Third, to control for the
ideological orientation of the county, we use the Republican vote share in the
1992 presidential election. We also control for educational attainment, as mea-
sured by the percentage of adults with a college degree.
Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) argue that population heterogeneity leads
to increased pressure for group-speciﬁc spending programs but fewer nonex-
cludable public goods. Although their theoretical model is ambiguous as to the
18 We have experimented with other measures as well. Most alternatives have a simple correlation
coefﬁcient in excess of .95. No alternative that we have tried produces different conclusions.
19 In principle, the aggregate tax rate is an ideal dependent variable. However, as a resultofvariation
in assessment practices across jurisdictions and complexity of tax codes, calculating the effective tax
rate in a county is prohibitively difﬁcult. We discuss results using alternative dependent variables in
Section 6.3.
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net effects, their empirical results show a positive association between ethnic
heterogeneity and total expenditures and taxes. Following Alesina, Baqir, and
Easterly (1999), we measure ethnic fragmentation as the probability that two
randomly drawn people from a county belong to different ethnic groups.
20 In-
come heterogeneity is measured as the ratio of the mean household income to
the median household income in a county. Along these lines, MeltzerandRichard
(1981, 1983) argue that increasing inequality causes greater demand for redis-
tribution and, hence, higher taxes.
To address economies-of-scale considerations, we control for county popu-
lation and land area.
21 In addition, we include a dummy variable indicating
whether a county is the central county of a metropolitan statistical area (MSA)
and another dummy for suburban counties within MSAs.
22 The omitted category
is nonmetropolitan counties. These central and suburban county indicators cap-
ture possible sorting by taste as well as potential economies of scale in MSAs.
Finally, states also vary in their assignment of ﬁscal responsibilities to local
governments and in unobservable historical, cultural, and institutional charac-
teristics that may inﬂuence both electoral density and ﬁscal outcomes. For this
reason, we include state ﬁxed effects in all of the models reported below.
23
Our main data sources are the Census of Governments (COG; U.S. Census
Bureau 1990, 1995), the 1990 Census of Population and Housing (CPH; U.S.
Census Bureau 1992), and the 1994 County and City Databook (CCD; U.S.
Census Bureau 1994). The data source for each variable is speciﬁed in Table 4.
Our selection criteria
24 produce an analysis sample of 2,965 counties.
25 Table 3
20 Speciﬁcally, ethnic fragmentation is computed as follows: , where Racei
2 Ethnic p 1  (Race) i i
denotes the share of population identiﬁed as being of race i and i p {White, Black, Hispanic, Asian
and Paciﬁc Islander, American Indian}. Note that Hispanic is identiﬁed as an origin rather than a
race in the census, so we count only non-Hispanic Whites, Blacks, Asian and Paciﬁc Islanders, and
American Indians for those categories. This same measure has been used in numerous prior studies;
see the references in Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999). For a theoretical interpretation of this index,
see Vigdor (2002).
21 One concern with this setup is that county population appears as both the denominator of the
dependent variable and on the right-hand side of the equation. Therefore, we also ran the analysis
excluding county population. The coefﬁcients changed, of course, but the substantive conclusions
did not.
22 In New England, the Census Bureau speciﬁes central cities and towns rather than centralcounties
of metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). In these states, we deﬁne any county containing a central
city or town as a central county.
23 The state ﬁxed effects coefﬁcients are not reported in the tables but are available from the authors
on request.
24 We exclude Virginia (134 observations), Hawaii (fourobservations),andAlaska(27observations)
from the analysis. Virginia is the only state whose municipalities are incorporated as independent
cities that are not part of any county. Hawaii has the only entirely state-run public school system.
Alaska uniquely relies on boroughs rather than counties, and boroughs do not cover the entire land
area of the state. Anomalously, the COG reports one record for New York City but no records for
its ﬁve component counties. Not being able to produce a county aggregate record, we drop the New
York City observation. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) also discuss this issue and make the same
decision. In addition, we exclude Shannon County, South Dakota, population 10,490, which is the
only county that has no elected ofﬁcials outside the county governing body.
25 There are some minor discrepancies in how counties are counted in the COG versus the Census
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presents summary statistics for various measures of electoral density for all
counties, whereas Table 4 presents summary statistics for all the variables based
on the 2,965 counties selected for the analysis.
6. Findings
Our main theoretical contribution is to offer a signiﬁcant extension and ap-
plication of the unbundling intuition for electoral institutions (Besley and Coate
2001, 2003). The inclusion of monitoring costs in the unbundling framework
produces different theoretical implications and empirical predictions. Instead of
suggesting a negative and largely linear effect of unbundling on slack in politics,
a diminishing—and potentially negative—return to unbundling may result.Add-
ing nonlegislative elected ofﬁcials in a jurisdiction should reduce slack by un-
bundling but should also increase monitoring costs. If our theory is correct,
spending should decrease initially as unbundling produces greater control over
elected ofﬁcials and subsequently increase as the marginal costs swamp any
unbundling gain.
To test this proposition, we estimate polynomial regression models of revenue
raising in local government. Because of the restrictive functional form assump-
tions inherent in the polynomial regression context, we also use a semiparametric
generalized additive model (GAM) in which we estimate the effect of electoral
density with thin-plate regression splines and allow all of the other covariates
to enter the model linearly.
26 Both methods produce similar results. The rela-
tionship appears to be U shaped, and the turning point is at an interior location
in the actual data.
An obvious concern with any study of the ﬁscal effects of political institutions
is endogeneity—namely, the possibility of simultaneous causation between in-
stitutional form and ﬁscal policy (see Persson and Tabellini 2003). In other words,
measures of electoral density may be correlated with the errors in an ordinary
least squares regression, leading to biased estimates. To a large degree, concerns
about reverse causation in this case should be allayed by the fact that electoral
institutions are enshrined in longstanding provisions of state constitutions and
city charters. For example, a set of state dummy variables explains more than
half of the variation in electoral density across counties.
27 Moreover, the cor-
relation between county-area elected ofﬁces per government in 1992 and 1987
is .97. Thus, it is unlikely that electoral institutions change quickly in response
of Population and Housing, primarily in Virginia and Alaska, which explain why the former tallies
3,135 counties and the latter 3,034. For models that measure electoral density as ofﬁces per gov-
ernment, we exclude an additional 37 counties that have no general purpose governments, leaving
an analysis sample of 2,928.
26 The seminal reference on generalized additive models is Hastie and Tibshirani (1990). Beck and
Jackman (1998) provide an accessible introduction. Our implementation follows Wood (2006) and
the associated R package, mgcv.
27 A regression of county aggregate elected ofﬁces per government on a set of state dummy variables
yields an adjusted R
2-value of .54, with 2,928 observations in our analysis sample.
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to local spending preferences. In this sense, we believe it is safe to consider
electoral institutions as predetermined, at least in the short run.
6.1. Elected Ofﬁces and Revenue
To estimate the effect of electoral institutions on ﬁscal outcomes, we regress
a log-transformed measure of each county’s own-source revenues per capita—
a standard measure used in the public ﬁnance literature—on measures of elected
ofﬁces per unit of government and per capita and their square. This is a straight-
forward polynomial regression model. The main results indicate that adding
elected ofﬁces decreases taxing at the low end of the distribution but increases
taxing after a certain point in the data. Speciﬁcally, the relationship between
specialized elected ofﬁces and taxing appears to be roughly U shaped. This is
true regardless of how electoral institutions are measured, and the result is robust
to a range of alternative speciﬁcations.
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 5 present coefﬁcients for a simple polynomial
equation without controls. Columns 2 and 4 present the coefﬁcient estimates
with the full controls included. The substantive conclusions are not sensitive to
the inclusion of controls. We therefore focus our discussion on the full equations.
Because the estimated model is a log-log regression, the coefﬁcients represent
elasticities, or the percentage change in the dependent variable of interest pro-
duced by a percentage change in the independent variable of interest. Note that
the coefﬁcient on elected ofﬁces is negative and the coefﬁcient on the squared
variable is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in all the models.
28
First, consider the model using elected ofﬁces per government (model 2). Both
the linear and squared versions of the variable are statistically signiﬁcant (p !
). The main variable has a negative effect, whereas the squared term has a .10
positive effect. The 1st percentile value of the main explanatory variable (log of
elected ofﬁces per 10 general purpose governments) is 1.8; the 99th percentile
value is 5.5 in the data. The observed turning point is at the 40th percentile of
the data, which corresponds to approximately 2.6 ofﬁces per government, a
threshold for which about 1,750 counties have a higher value—that is, 40 percent
of the counties in the sample have fewer elected ofﬁces per government than
the turning point. Adding elected ofﬁces to these counties would reduce, rather
than increase, overall revenue raising. For 60 percent of the counties, however,
adding elected ofﬁces would actually increase spending. The estimates from the
28 Includingasquared versionofanotherindependentvariableintheregressiongeneratessigniﬁcant
collinearity. The simple correlations are approximately .97. This does not produce biased coefﬁcient
estimates; however, it does affect the standard errors of the coefﬁcients. To address this issue, in
models not shown here, we mean deviated the explanatory variable of interest before squaring. This
linear transformation produces identicalcoefﬁcientsbutreducescollinearitysigniﬁcantly.Therelevant
coefﬁcient standard errors fall substantially.
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Polynomial Regression Models of Own-Source Revenue
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Elected ofﬁces per government) .286** .149

(.095) (.083)
ln(Elected ofﬁces per government)
2 .033* .023*
(.013) (.011)
ln(Elected ofﬁces per 1 million capita) .445** .198**
(.041) (.051)
ln(Elected ofﬁces per 1 million capita)
2 .033** .018**
(.003) (.003)
ln(Average council size) .096* .101*
(.045) (.043)
ln(Income per capita) 1.336** 1.386**
(.081) (.079)
ln(Population) .349** .220*
(.070) (.097)
ln(Population)
2 .015** .009

(.003) (.004)
Ethnic fractionalization .228** .219**
(.080)** (.079)
Income ratio .379 .329**
(.131) (.127)
Population 65 and older (%) .026** .020**
(.005) (.005)
Families with children (%) .019** .018**
(.004) (.004)
Adults with college degree or more (%) .008** .006**
(.002) (.002)
Central county .071* .071*
(.034) (.034)
Suburban county .137** .141**
(.026) (.026)
ln(Land area) .094** .106**
.018) .018)
Federal intergovernmental revenue per capita
($1,000s) .418** .421**
(.119) (.115)
State intergovernmental revenue per capita
($1,000s) .128** .094*
(.047) (.046)
Republican vote share, 1992 .001 .001
(.001) (.001)
Population growth 1980–92 .003** .003**
(.001) (.001)
ln(Municipalities) .042
* .062**
(.025) (.022)
ln(Townships) .010 .038

(.018) (.022)
ln(Special districts) .068** .076**
(.016) (.016)
ln(School districts) .056** .033
(.021) (.022)
Adjusted R
2-value .01 .25 .05 .27
N 2,928 2,928 2,965 2,965
Counties above turning point 401 1,753 1,322 2,368
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All models include state ﬁxed effects (not reported).
Electoral density is measured as ln(elected ofﬁces per 10 generalpurpose governments)andasln(elected
ofﬁces per 1 million capita). The dependent variable is ln(own-source revenue per capita).
 . p ! .10
*. p ! .05
** . p ! .01
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Table 6
Predicted Own-Source Revenues at Different Values of Electoral
Density: Elected Ofﬁces per Government
Percentile
ln(Elected Ofﬁces per
10 Governments)
Elected Ofﬁces
per Government
Predicted
Revenue
($)
1st
Difference
2d
Difference
1 1.83 .63 878.65
5 2.42 1.12 852.26 26.39
10 2.64 1.40 846.04 6.21 32.61
25 3.00 2.00 839.90 6.14 12.36
50 3.40 3.00 838.85 1.05 7.20
75 4.01 5.50 849.03 10.18 9.13
90 4.50 9.00 868.01 18.98 29.17
95 4.70 11.00 878.64 10.63 29.61
99 5.44 23.00 933.43 54.79 65.42
Note. Percentiles are the empirical distributions of electoral density. The ﬁnaltwocolumnspresentmarginal
shifts in revenue, equivalently, the difference between the given and immediately prior listed percentile (or
two prior listed percentiles) of electoral density. For computing the predicted values, all covariates are set
at means except dummy variables, which are set to their mode.
per capita measures (model 4) support similar conclusions.
29 The 1st percentile
of log of elected ofﬁces per million capita is 2.75; the 99th percentile value is
9.7. The estimated turning point is 5.46, at approximately the 20th percentile.
In untransformed terms, the turning point is .24 ofﬁces per 1,000 capita (cor-
responding to the same 20th percentile of the data). In sum, the polynomial
regression models of own-source revenues support the hypothesis of a U-shaped
relationship between specialized elected ofﬁcials and taxing.
To get a better sense of the magnitude of these effects, Tables 6 and 7 present
the difference in predicted mean revenues, setting continuous covariates to their
means and dummy variables to their modes and allowing the measures of elec-
toral density to vary.
30 To illustrate, the value corresponding to the 5th percentile
of the number of elected ofﬁces per government is 2.42, which produces a
predicted level of per capita revenues of approximately $852. The value of the
variable for elected ofﬁces per 10 governments at the 10th percentile is 2.64,
which produces a predicted mean level of per capita revenues of $846. Moving
from the 5th percentile to the 10th percentile therefore produces a net decrease
in own-source revenues of approximately $6. Again, the estimated turning point
29 The variables for both elected ofﬁces per capita and elected ofﬁces per government contain
values less than one. When these negative values are squared, the ordering of the underlying data
is not maintained because both negative and positive numbers are treated identically after transfor-
mation. To preserve the original ordering, we simply express the ﬁrst variable as elected ofﬁces per
1 million capita and the second as ofﬁces per 10 governments. The addition of a constant produces
identical coefﬁcient estimates on the untransformed term but avoids changing the ordering of the
original data.
30 The values of the distribution points are summaries of the log of elected ofﬁces per 10 general
purpose governments (Table 6) and the log of elected ofﬁces per 1 million people (Table 7). The
ﬁrst differences represent changes in per capita revenues raised shifting from row i in the tables to
row i  1.
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Table 7
Predicted Own-Source Revenues at Different Values of Electoral
Density: Elected Ofﬁces per Capita
Percentile
ln(Elected Ofﬁces
per 1 Million
Capita)
Elected Ofﬁces
per 1,000
Capita
Predicted
Revenue
($)
1st
Difference
2d
Difference
1 2.76 .02 917.56
5 3.94 .05 838.60 78.95
10 4.64 .10 814.26 24.35 103.30
25 5.72 .31 805.44 8.82 33.16
50 6.63 .76 824.73 19.30 10.48
75 7.41 1.66 861.98 37.24 56.54
90 8.27 3.92 928.29 66.31 103.56
95 8.82 6.79 987.02 58.73 125.04
99 9.77 17.47 1125.47 138.45 197.18
Note. Percentiles are the empirical distributions of electoral density. The ﬁnaltwocolumnspresentmarginal
shifts in revenue, equivalently, the difference between the given and immediately prior listed percentile (or
two prior listed percentiles) of electoral density. For computing the predicted values, all covariates are set
at means except dummy variables which are set to their mode.
in the polynomial regression model is at the 40th percentile. At this point in
the distribution of elected ofﬁces per government, the predicted mean of own-
source revenues is $838. Small shifts at or around the 40th percentile of the data
produce virtually no changes in revenues. The results are essentially similar for
the per capita measure of elected ofﬁces.
The costs of monitoring additional elected ofﬁces may, at some point, offset
the beneﬁts of issue unbundling, leading to a roughly U-shaped relationship
with spending, but there is no special reason to expect that this relationship is
quadratic per se. To test the sensitivity of our results to functional form as-
sumptions, we estimate the effects of elected ofﬁces semiparametrically using a
GAM with thin-plate regression splines and allow all of the other covariates to
enter the model linearly. The results are summarized in Figure 1, whichrepresents
the relationship between the measures of electoral density and revenue raising.
31
Solid lines represent point estimates; dashed lines represent 95 percentconﬁdence
intervals. In each of the graphs, the curve is downward sloping and turns upward
at a point well within the data. The U shape is clearly evident in the estimated
effects of elected ofﬁces per capita. Put simply, the results from the GAM lend
further support to the conclusions of the simple polynomial regression model.
The relationship between electoral institutions and ﬁscal policy is not linear;
rather, increasing the number of elected ofﬁcials reduces revenue raising in
counties with few elected ofﬁcials but increases spending in counties with many
elected ofﬁcials. The quadratic ﬁt in the linear models achieves a satisfactory
approximation of the underlying relationship.
Returning to Table 5, we see another notable result: as the average size of
31 The results are similar for both the per capita and per-government measures. We therefore
present only the per capita ﬁgures herein.
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Figure 1. Generalized additive model estimates of own-source revenue
legislative bodies in a county increases, taxation and spending increase as well.
In all the models, the coefﬁcient hovers at approximately .10; a 1-percentage-
point increase in the average size of the governing body produces an increase
of roughly .1 percentage point in revenue raised from own sources. This result
is consistent with prior ﬁndings from Baqir (2002), who ﬁnds an elasticity of
.11 in a comparable model. Putting the results together, we see that increasing
the size of legislative bodies increases taxing, but adding other nonlegislative
elected ofﬁcials can reduce or can increase taxing, depending on how many
elected ofﬁcials are already present in the jurisdiction. These ﬁndings are con-
sistent with the law of 1/n, as well as the theory of unbundling and monitoring
costs. The coefﬁcients on the covariates are not of primary interest to our work.
However, it is reassuring that the ﬁndings are largely consistent with the existing
literature.
32 Moreover, identical conclusions follow when the dependent variable
32 The other control variables are fairly standard in the literature. However, a few coefﬁcients are
noteworthy. First, income is an important determinant of own-source revenue, and the elasticity is
greater than one, as predicted by Wagner’s law ( in the equation including elected ofﬁces b p 1.3
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is replaced with measures of aggregate expenditures, many line-item expendi-
tures, and the use of debt by governments.
6.2. First-Differences Analysis
The results presented thus far are based on cross-sectional county aggregate
data for 1992. We have argued that electoral institutions can be considered
predetermined in the short run, thus mitigating some of the usual concerns with
cross-sectional analysis. Nevertheless, in this section we test the robustness of
our results by estimating the main ﬁndings in ﬁrst differences. Differencing the
data strips away the effects of any observable or unobservable variables that do
not change over time. Thus, this strategy addresses any lingering concerns about
omitted variables that may inﬂuence both electoral institutions and ﬁscal out-
comes.
Data on elected ofﬁces in local governments are available in electronic form
from the COG for 1987 and 1992 (U.S. Census Bureau 1990, 1995). We merge
these 2 years of data to create a short panel of county aggregate data. Consistent
with our argument that electoral institutions do not change quickly, we note
that we do not have a great deal of between-year variation in our measures of
electoral density. The correlation between elected ofﬁces per government in 1987
and 1992 is .97; for elected ofﬁces per capita, it is .96. Nevertheless, 370 counties
spanning 42 states changed their number of elected ofﬁces per government by
at least one ofﬁce between 1987 and 1992, whichprovidesabasisforidentiﬁcation
in our ﬁrst-difference models. In any event, the relatively modest cross-year
variation should, if anything, bias the analysis against ﬁnding signiﬁcant effects.
Because most of our demographic variables are from the 1990 census, we are
not able to include them in the ﬁrst-difference models; we do not have inde-
pendent values for 1992 and 1987. However, the effects of these and other
per government and in the equation including elected ofﬁces per capita). In addition, the b p 1.4
degree of ethnic fractionalization is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, whereas the ratio of mean
to median income, a rough measure of the degree of economic heterogeneity in the jurisdiction,
shows a signiﬁcant negative relationship with own-source revenue. These estimates are consistent
with prior work (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999). Counties with more children proportionally
raise slightly more own-source revenues than do counties with fewer children, as do counties with
a higher proportion of college graduates. In addition, suburban counties spend signiﬁcantly less than
central or rural counties, which could reﬂect sorting by preferences or greater interjurisdictional
competition (Schneider 1989). We also ﬁnd a quadratic relationship between county population and
own-source revenue, consistent with Baqir (2002). Population growth is negatively associated with
own-source revenue, which may suggest that it takes time for spending to catch up with population
in rapidly growing areas. The coefﬁcients on federal intergovernmental revenue per capita and state
intergovernmental revenue per capita are positive and statisticallysigniﬁcantinbothmodels.Counties
with governments that receive more intergovernmental revenue per capita also raise more per capita
from own-source revenues, consistent with the “ﬂypaper” effect (see, for example, Hines and Thaler,
1995). One concern with these results is that intergovernmental revenue may be jointly determined
with own-source revenue. In results not shown, we reestimated all the models in the paper excluding
the intergovernmental revenue variables. The results for electoral density did not change notably.
Finally, in both sets of equations, partisanship appears to matter relatively little. The proportion of
the county that voted for the Republican presidential candidate in 1992 produces virtually no change
in the level of own-source revenue per capita.
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variables that do not change signiﬁcantly over the 5-year period will be washed
out in the ﬁrst differencing. We do include as predictors a smaller set of variables
for which we are able to measure changes between 1987 and 1992. These include
average council size, population and its square, and the number of governments
of different types in the county. In addition, we include a functional performance
index (FPI) that sums nationwide median spending for each service provided
in the county.
33 The FPI should capture changes in spending over time that are
associated with changes in functional performance.
Table 8 presents results of the ﬁrst-differences models
34 in which we regress
changes in own-source revenue between 1987 and 1992 on changes in the in-
dependent variables. The results are consistent with our cross-sectional models.
In all speciﬁcations, there is a statistically signiﬁcant quadratic relationship be-
tween electoral density and own-source revenues. We can, therefore, be reason-
ably conﬁdent that the cross-sectional results presented above are not driven by
omitted variable bias.
Interestingly, however, the results for council size change notably in the ﬁrst-
differences model. There is a signiﬁcant negative effect of average council size
in both models, which is at odds with the positive coefﬁcient from the cross-
sectional models. In models not shown, we also ﬁnd a positive effect of council
size when we exclude the other independent variables. The most natural inter-
pretation of these results is that the positive effects of council size in the cross-
sectional analyses are due to omitted variable bias. Because council size is not
our main variable of interest, we do not pursue the issue further here.
6.3. Robustness
None of the main substantive conclusions are sensitive to a variety of changes
in modeling decisions or estimation methods. First, in the results presented,
robust standard errors are used to account for heteroskedasticity. Clustered stan-
dard errors, however, were not used because the state ﬁxed effects in all of the
models effectively transform the observations to deviations from state means.
With only one observation per county, there is little a priori reason to expect
33 The functional performance index (FPI) is deﬁned as follows. For each functional spending
category in the COG, we create a binary variable for each county indicating whether the county has
positive spending for that function. Next we compute median spending on each function among
those counties in which the function is provided. For each county, we then sum nationwide median
spending on each function it provides. This summary index indicates the amount a county would
spend if it spent the nationwide median amount on each service it provides. Formally, the index is
deﬁned as follows: , where i indexes functional spending categories and j indexes FPI p am ji j i i
counties; aij is one if county j provides service i and zero if it does not, and mi represents nationwide
median spending on service i among all counties that provide the service. Thus, a county’s FPI will
increase whenever it adds a new service and whenever nationwide median spending on its existing
services increases. This is a variation on the method of Clark, Ferguson, and Shapiro (1982).
34 Because wehave onlytwotimeperiods,ﬁxedeffectsandﬁrst-differencesmodelsproduceidentical
results.
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Table 8
First-Differences Estimates, 1987–92
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Elected ofﬁces per government) .256* .206*
(.121) (.103)
ln(Elected ofﬁces per government)
2 .049* .039*
(.020) (.017)
ln(Elected ofﬁces per 1 million capita) .153* .162*
(.071) (.077)
ln(Elected ofﬁces per 1 million capita)
2 .014* .017**
(.006) (.007)
ln(Average council size) .080** .067**
(.024) (.025)
ln(Population) 1.105** 1.565**
(.403) (.401)
ln(Population)
2 .042* .061**
(.019) (.019)
ln(Functional performance index) 1.233** 1.227**
(.090) (.090)
ln(Municipalities) .097 .030
(.109) (.092)
ln(Townships) .031 .055

(.026) (.032)
ln(Special districts) .013 .013
(.015) (.015)
ln(School districts) .096* .098*
(.047) (.046)
Adjusted R
2-value .01 .14 .01 .14
N 2,931 2,931 2,968 2,967
Note. The dependent variable is ln(own-source revenue per capita). Robust standard errors are in paren-
theses. Electoral density is measured as ln(elected ofﬁces per 10 general purpose governments) and as
ln(elected ofﬁces per 1 million capita).
 . p ! .10
*. p ! .05
** . p ! .01
within-state correlations in the residuals from the mean-deviated regressions.
35
Nevertheless, to test the sensitivity of our results to this methodological choice
and to account for anypossible pattern ofwithin-statecorrelationintheresiduals,
each model was estimated using standard errors clustered by state. Although the
clustered standard errors are somewhat larger than those reported, the results
remain signiﬁcant at conventional levels in every case. Second, the results are
robust to an alternative indicator of the main dependent variable. Ideally, the
aggregate local tax rate would be the main dependent variable, but such data
are not readily available. In the results presented, own-source revenue per capita
is used as a rough proxy for the local tax rate, consistent with the empirical
literature on local public ﬁnance. As a robustness exercise,however,allthemodels
35 If we had a panel of data with multiple years for each county, serial correlation would be an
obvious concern (Bertrand, Duﬂo, and Mullainathan 2004), but with only 1 year of data, serial
correlation is not at issue here. The same point applies to the ﬁrst-difference models (Table 8), where
we have only one observation (that is, one difference) per county.
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were reestimated with 1992 aggregate county income (based on data from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis’s Regional Economic Information System) as the
denominator for the dependent variable. In all cases, the results are substantively
unchanged. Finally, several of our control variables, such as state and federal aid
and the number of local governments, could conceivably be endogenous. The
results, however, are robust to dropping those variables from any of the models
reported above.
7. Discussion
The theoretical and empirical literature in economics and political science
contains divergent predictions about the relationship between electoral institu-
tions and the ﬁscal behavior of governments. One collection of scholarship
predicts that overspending bias will increase with the number of elected ofﬁcials.
Another predicts that increasing the number of elected ofﬁces will improve the
ability of voters to manage the principal-agent problem of representation. A third
predicts that policy outcomes will be largely invariant to the number or nature
of electoral institutions.
Against this backdrop, we have sought to make two theoretical contributions.
First, we have emphasizedthat all electedofﬁcialsarenotidentical.Addingelected
ofﬁcials serving in districted general purpose legislative bodies may well produce
increases in spending and greater slack between voters and politicians. However,
when new elected ofﬁces generate unbundling, voter control over politicians
should increase. The precise form of electoral institutions matters. Second, al-
though we ﬁnd nascent work on unbundling to be extremely promising, we also
suggest that it is incomplete in its current form. Unbundling should help manage
agency problems, but it often also produces new monitoring costs. A theory of
electoral institutions must account for both.
Our main empirical contribution has been to offer evidence of a U-shaped
relationship between elected ofﬁces in local government and patterns of gov-
ernment taxing and spending. An important, if secondary, empiricalcontribution
is to demonstrate that the relationship between council size and spending is
sensitive to the inclusion of unit-level ﬁxed effects, although more work is clearly
warranted to explain why. In any case, we ﬁnd little evidence that electoral
institutions are irrelevant to the ﬁscal behavior of local government. Our analysis
then supports the basic idea that elections matter but adds signiﬁcant nuance
to this claim.
If our theoretical apparatus is correct, it suggests a number of potential future
research questions. Perhaps most important, we have treated institutional var-
iation as exogenous for purposes of our analysis, but it is clear that institutional
choices—perhaps made long ago—shape the local political and ﬁscal landscape
in important ways. Investigating the sources of these institutional choices is at
the top of our future research agenda.
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8. Conclusion
Our analysis links several strains of literature in economics, law, and political
science on the relationship between political institutions and policy outcomes.
Our central ﬁnding is that differences in the number of elected ofﬁcials in local
government produce signiﬁcant differences in the level of taxing and spending.
With respect to non-legislative-body elected ofﬁcials, adding ofﬁcials to juris-
dictions with few existing ofﬁcials decreases spending and taxing. Adding ofﬁcials
to jurisdictions with lots of electedofﬁcials actuallyincreasestaxingandspending.
This manifests empirically as a U-shaped relationship between the number of
elected ofﬁcials and ﬁscal behavior.
With respect to theoretical models of politics, our ﬁndings suggest the im-
portance of better theorizing not just about elections writ large but also with
respect to how variation in local political and institutional arrangements might
facilitate or undermine the use of elections to control legislators. In this sense,
our work ﬁts into a long-standing tradition of scholarship that uses economic,
demographic, and political characteristics toexploretaxingandspendingpatterns
by state and local government. However, by relying on county-level data and
the nonlinear functional form, we are able to provide a novel perspective on
politics, institutional structure, and public ﬁnance.
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